Spills
LNG vaporizes rapidly when exposed to ambient heat sources such as water,
producing approximately 600 standard cubic meter of natural gas for each cubic
meter of liquid.
A potentially significant environmental and safety hazard from LNG shipping is
related to Rapid Phase Transition (RPT) that can occur when LNG is
accidentally spilled onto water at a very fast rate. The heat transfer from water
to spilled LNG causes LNG to instantly convert from its liquid phase to its
gaseous phase. The large amount of energy released during a RPT can cause
a physical explosion with no combustion or chemical reaction. The hazard
potential of rapid phase transitions can be severe, but is generally localized
within the spill area.
Fires and Explosions
Fire and explosion hazards at LNG facilities may result from the
presence of combustible gases and liquids, oxygen, and ignition sources during loading and unloading activities, and / or leaks
and spills of flammable products. Possible ignition sources include sparks associated with the buildup of static electricity19,
lightning, and open flames. The accidental release of LNG may generate the formation of an evaporating liquid pool, potentially
resulting in a pool fire and / or the dispersion of a cloud of natural gas from pool evaporation.
Static electricity may be generated by liquids moving in contact with other
materials, including pipes and fuel tanks during loading and unloading of
product. In addition, water mist and steam generated during tank and equipment
cleaning can be come electrically charged, in particular with the presence of
chemical cleaning agents.
Control of ignition sources is especially relevant in areas of potential
flammable vapor-air mixtures such as within vapor space of tanks, within vapor
space of rail / truck tankers during loading / unloading, near vapor disposal /
recovery systems, near discharge vents of atmospheric tanks, in proximity to a
leak or spill.
In its liquid state, LNG is not explosive. For an explosion to occur with LNG, it must first vaporize, then mix with air in the proper proportions (the flammable range is 5% to 15%), and then be ignited.
Serious accidents involving LNG to date are listed below:
* 1944, 20 October, Cleveland, Ohio. The East Ohio Natural Gas Company experienced a failure of an LNG tank in Cleveland,
Ohio. 128 people perished in the explosion and fire. The tank did not have a dike retaining wall, and it was made during World War II, when metal rationing was very strict. The steel of the tank was made with an extremely low amount of nickel, which made the tank brittle when exposed to the extreme cold of LNG, and the tank ruptured, spilling LNG into the city sewer system.
* 1973, February, Staten Island, New York. While repairing the interior of an empty storage tank, a fire
started. The pressure increased inside the tank so fast the concrete dome on the tank lifted and then collapsed falling inside the tank and
killing the 37 construction workers below. No LNG was involved in this incident.
* 1979, October, Lusby, Maryland, at the Cove Point LNG facility a pump seal failed, releasing gas vapors, which entered and settled in an electrical
conduit. A worker switched off a circuit breaker, igniting the gas vapors,
killing a worker and causing heavy damage to the building. National fire codes were changed as a result of the accident.
* 2004, 19 January, Skikda, Algeria. Explosion at Sonatrach LNG liquefaction
facility. 27 killed, 80 injured, three LNG trains destroyed, 2004 production was down 76% for the year. A cold hydrocarbon leak occurred and hydrocarbon gases were drawn into the combustion air for a high-pressure steam boiler. The explosion inside the boiler fire box precipitated a larger explosion of vapors outside the box.
To begin, there have been instances of pipelines rupturing. You
can view a video of the 36" Texas Eastern Transmission
Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline in Edison, New Jersey explosion
here.
A fire of this magnitude could destroy homes and would most
likely set forests aflame.
The Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, the owner of the 33-year-old underground pipeline that ruptured and set off a fiery explosion in central New Jersey, was responsible for three fatal accidents in the 1980's in the South and Midwest. And it is a partner in a venture responsible for a 1990 propane explosion that enveloped an upstate New York village in a fog-like vapor and killed two people.
*On Nov. 25, 1984, a natural gas line operated by Texas Eastern exploded near Jackson, La., leaving five people dead and 22 injured. The blast "created a hole in the earth about 90 feet long, 25 feet wide and 10 feet deep" and incinerated an area hundreds of feet in all directions, according to an investigator's report. The safety board later concluded that the company had failed to install the 30-inch pipeline properly -- among other things, it found one section of misaligned pipe, and it said some of the soil at the site was not firm enough to support the pipe.
*In 1985 and 1986, two separate accidents involving a stretch of Texas Eastern pipeline in Kentucky killed five people and injured six and forced a wide evacuation. In both instances, the safety board blamed the company for failing to detect corrosion in the pipes, although it also blamed the Federal Office of Pipeline Safety for failing to develop a new industrywide standard for monitoring corrosion in the nation's pipeline system.
*In March 1990, two people were killed in North Blenheim, N.Y., and the center of the town was turned into a blackened wasteland when a propane line cracked and exploded. The partnership that operated the line, the Texas Eastern Products Pipeline Company, was partly owned by Texas Eastern. Again, while the company blamed a manufacturer's defect, the safety board found lapses in inspection procedures.
In addition, a review of all safety board files pertaining to Texas Eastern in recent years found at least two other instances in which the Federal Government issued recommendations that indicated lapses in the company's performance. But it was not revealed what had prompted them.
While there have been other accidents involving Texas Eastern equipment, some of those did not result in any findings that the company was to blame. For instance, in August 1992, an Ohio Bell telephone crew laying fiber optic cable ruptured a section of pipeline, igniting an eruption that killed two people.
But Federal officials concluded that the pipeline was properly laid and that there adequate warning signs that there was a gas line in the area. A company spokesman, Stewart Lawrence, said today that the company had an active program to alert people in its service area to call before any digging, but that accidents were still bound to happen.
"We do everything we can to protect a line from outside forces, but that's not something we can always prevent," Mr. Lawrence said. Periodic Inspections
The pipeline that ruptured in Edison, N.J., just past midnight Wednesday was part of a massive network delivering natural gas from Texas and the Gulf Coast states to the Northeast and Midwest. The particular pipe that ruptured, three feet in diameter and buried seven feet deep, was installed in 1961 and was subject to periodic inspections by both the company and the Transportation Department.
"Our pipelines are extremely safe," Mr. Lawrence said. "It's hard to convince somebody of that when a situation like this happens," he said, referring to the Edison explosion. "But that is the confidence we are trying very hard to win back."
Accidents
Explosions and Fires
*
October 1944, Cleveland, Ohio - At the Cleveland peak-shaving plant a tank failed and spilled its contents into the street and storm sewer system. The resulting explosion and fire killed 128 people. The tank was built with a steel alloy that had low-nickel content, which made the alloy brittle when exposed to the extreme cold of LNG.
*
1964 and 1965 Methane Progress.- While loading LNG in Arzew, Algeria, lightning struck the forward vent riser of the Methane Progress and ignited vapor which was being routinely vented through the ship venting system. A similar event happened early in 1965 while the vessel was at sea shortly after leaving Arzew. In both cases, the flame was quickly extinguished by purging with nitrogen through a connection to the riser.
*
1969,
Portland, Oregon - An explosion occurred in an LNG tank under construction. No LNG had ever been introduced into the tank. The cause of the accident was attributed to the accidental removal of blinds from natural gas pipelines which were connected to the tank. This led to the flow of natural gas into the tank while it was being constructed.
*
January 1972, Montreal East, Quebec, Canada - A back flow of natural gas from the compressor to the nitrogen line occurred during defrosting operations at an LNG liquefaction and peak shaving plant. The valves on the nitrogen were not closed after completing the operation. This caused over-pressurization of the compressor and the natural gas entered the control room (where operators were allowed to smoke) through the nitrogen header. An explosion occurred when an operator tried to light a cigarette.
*
February 1973, Staten Island, New York- While repairing the interior of an empty storage tank, a fire started. The resulting increase in pressure inside the tank was so fast that the concrete dome on the tank lifted and then collapsed down inside the tank killing the 37 construction workers inside.
*
October 1979, Cove Point, Maryland - A natural gas leak caused an explosion killing one plant employee and seriously injuring another and causing about $3 million in damages.
*
April 1983, Bontang, Indonesia - A rupture in an LNG plant occurred as a result of overpressurization of the heat exchanger caused by a closed valve on a blowdown line. The exchanger was designed to operate at 25.5 psig. When the gas pressure reached 500 psig, the exchanger failed and the explosion occurred.
*
August 1987, Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada - An accidental ignition of an LNG vapor cloud occurred at the U.S. Department of Energy Test Site during large-scale tests involving spills of LNG. The cloud was accidentally ignited and damaged and propelled polyurethane pipe insulation outside the fence.
*
June 2004, Trinidad, Tobago - Workers were evacuated after a gas turbine at Atlantic LNG's Train 3 facility exploded.
*
July 2004, Ghislenghien, Belgium - A pipeline carrying natural gas from the Belgian port of Zeebrugge to northern France exploded, resulting in 23 known fatalities. The cause of the incident is still under investigation but it appears that a contractor accidentally damaged the pipe.
*
March 2005, District Heights, Maryland - A Washington Gas company-sponsored study released in July 2005 pointed to subtle molecular differences in the imported liquefied natural gas the utility began using in August 2003 as the cause of a house explosion.
Spills and Leaks
*
Early 1965, Methane Princess Spill - LNG discharging arms were disconnected prematurely before the lines had been completely drained, causing LNG liquid to pass through a partially opened valve and onto a stainless steel drip pan placed underneath the arms. This caused a star-shaped fracture to appear in the deck plating in spite of the application of seawater.
*
May 1965, Jules Verne Spill - LNG liquid spill at Arzew, Algeria, caused by overflowing of a cargo tank that resulted in the fracture of the cover plating of the tank and adjacent deck plating.
*
1971, La Spezia, Italy - This accident was caused by �rollover� where two layers of LNG with different densities and heat content form. The sudden mixing of these two layers results in the release of large volumes of vapor. In this case, about 2,000 tons of LNG vapor discharged from the tank safety vales and vents over a period of a few hours, damaging the roof of the tank.
*
July 1974, Massachusetts Barge Spill - After a power failure and the automatic closure of the main liquid line valves, 40 gallons of LNG leaked as it was being loaded on a barge. The LNG leaked from a one-inch nitrogen-purge globe valve on the vessel�s liquid header. This leak caused several fractures to the deck plates.
*
September 1977, Aquarius Spill - During the filling of a cargo tank at Bontang, LNG overflowed through the vent mast serving that tank. The incident may have been caused by difficulties in the liquid level gauge system. The high-level alarm had been placed in the override mode to eliminate nuisance alarms.
*
March 1978, Das Island, United Arab Emirates - An accident occurred due to the failure of a bottom pipe connection of an LNG tank. The tank had a double wall (a nine-percent nickel steel inner wall and a carbon steel outer wall). Vapor from the outer shell of the tank formed a large heavier-than-air cloud which did not ignite.
*
April 1979, Mostafa Ben Bouliad Spill - While discharging cargo at Cove Point, Maryland, a check valve in the piping system of the vessel failed releasing a small quantity of LNG. This resulted in minor fractures of the deck plating.
*
April 1979, Pollenger Spill - While the vessel was discharging LNG at a terminal in Everett, Massachusetts, LNG leaking from a valve gland apparently fractured one of the tank�s cover plating.
Write the Governor
Write the Governor
Onward Oregon has chosen LNG as their currently featured issue to alert and activate people about. They've set up a
(http://www.onwardoregon.org/lng/) web page where you can write to the Governor and all our elected state reps in one easy step. It takes very little time and is a powerful tool to get your voice heard. For both the Oregonian and the Governor - NUMBERS COUNT! If they hear from 12 people, they figure it is an issue they can ignore. If they hear from 112 people - they will pay attention!
Write the Oregonian
Write the Oregonian
After ignoring LNG for more than 2 years, in the last few months we have
finally seen a little coverage in the Oregonian. Two articles by Ted Sickinger
(August 21 and
September
1), an editorial
(August 26) and the publication of Brent Foster's guest editorial (Aug. 28). It is important that they hear from their readers in response to any of these. We want them to continue to cover LNG and they need to know their readers care about these issues
(read the letters from Sept.
2).
Send letters to: letters@news.oregonian.com
mailto:letters@news.oregonian.com
Natural gas industry experts - supported by peer reviewed studies and findings - have stated that, for safety reasons, no person should be within 900 feet or more on either side of a 36 inch natural gas pipeline at the planned local send out psi (1500 psi) when there is a pipeline rupture - and there will be pipeline ruptures at the time of an earthquake as there have been in every other community of this planet where there has been a devastating earthquake. It has been reported that the last Cascadia Subduction earthquake was felt 125 miles inland. 36†natural gas pipeline failures and massive fires with loss of life are well documented and must be anticipated here.
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
18 May 2001
March 23, 1994, in Edison, New Jersey.
A 36-inch-diameter natural gas pipeline, Line 20, owned and operated by Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation (TETCO), failed catastrophically on March 23, 1994. The ruptured portion of the buried pipeline was on the property of Quality Materials, Inc., (Quality). Escaping gas from the pipeline was ignited within minutes after the rupture, sending flames several hundred feet into the air. Radiant heat from the burning gas ignited a fire at the Durham Woods Apartment Complex, located more than 100 yards from the rupture site. The fire destroyed several buildings on the west side of this apartment complex. Estimated damage from the accident exceeded $25 million. No fatalities resulted from the accident.
As a result of its investigation, the Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was mechanical damage to the exterior surface of the pipe that reduced the pipe wall thickness and likely created a crack in the gouge that grew, most likely through metal fatigue, to critical size.
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/1995/PAR9501r.pdf
Edison, N.J. Pipeline Explosion & MCI
3/23/94 to 3/27/94
http://www.rxn.com/~uffda/archive/science/edison.txt
The following is an account of the natural gas pipeline explosion that occurred the night of March 23, 1994, in Edison, NJ. It details the public safety response over a four day stretch, including police, fire, and EMS. It is comprised of eyewitness accounts, staff reports, and Emergency Management information. It should not be construed as official or public information.
Approximately 23:58, 3/23/94
Leaking natural gas from a Texas Eastern Pipeline Co. pipeline reaches atmosphere and de-pressurizes, causing an explosion ripping apart nearly 80
feet of pipe, and sending debris flying over 3/4 mile in all directions. The explosion is sufficient to knock sleeping residents of the Durham Woods apartment complex out of their beds and shatter windows.
The rupture was felt as far away as Reading PA (Distance:
104 miles away, driving time:
1 hour 45 minutes) and Long Island, NY (Distance:
36 miles away, driving time:
44 minutes).
Awakened and stunned, residents of the nearby buildings 19-26 began to realize the explosion and hastily leave their apartments. Some realize the imminent danger, and are convinced of their fate. Meanwhile, reports to 9-1-1 start to arrive concerning "a loud explosion somewhere in South Edison".
Within 3 minutes, a spark from flying debris, static electricity, or whatever, ignites the escaping gas.
A blow torch of extremely hot flames (1500-2000 *F) some 600 ft. high and 200 yards across now exists. Winds are pushing the flames towards the apartments.
The ignition is witnessed simultaneously by both Edison and Piscataway Twp. police units. It is unclear as to the location of the source. Numerous 9-1-1 calls are now clogging the system, as police units follow the glow to the source. Residents of the nearby buildings are now fleeing with whatever they have on their backs, some being burned from behind by the intense heat. Residents in other buildings now start to awaken.
00:07 hrs., 3/24/94
Within 9 minutes of the initial blast, 4 structures are already involved, products of spontaneous combustion due to radiant heat. Ambient temperature at the Durhams Woods apartment was read to be already 74* F. Hundreds of people are now running away from the blaze, most in bare feet and without any belongings.
00:09 hrs.
At just after midnight, I was preparing to leave my girlfriend's home in South Edison, when a sound "like a low flying jet plane" caught my attention and shook the table in the basement. Assuming it was a plane, I thought nothing of it, until the sound did not diminish as it should have. As I looked out the back door (which faces directly away from the origin), I saw the treetops "glowing". I yelled that something on the nearby NJ Turnpike must have crashed and exploded. I ran to the front door to get a better look, and noticed the flames for the first time.
Even from 3.5 mi. away, the fire appeared to be just down the street.
This, in fact, is why so many calls were made to 9-1-1. Simultaneously, Squad #2 in the north district received a call on the business line that a house on Peru St. was on fire. Upon calling into dispatch, the rig was met with the reply "we are getting calls of numerous explosions all over Edison. Investigate and report". Several callers phoned in saying they were actually watching Menlo Park Mall burning, which is nearly 6 mi. from the actual fire.
I immediately called into my station, and was told that the Mobil Chemical Research Center on nearby Rt. 27 had exploded. Most people who called 9-1-1 stated this is what they thought was burning.
I paged my Captain, who was working in Princeton, to return to Edison. He was able to see the glow from 32
miles away.
00:14 hrs.
NJSP New Jersey State Police shut down I-287 for 2 miles each way next to the complex.
Engines at the interior sector had no choice but to take up defensive postures and wet down surrounding buildings. Now 8 buildings were fully involved, along with numerous cars, as more than 1,000 remaining residents continued to flee.
Radio reports now came over detailing a "pipeline involved". It began to look like daytime, enough to warrant sunglasses.
00:29 hrs.
Edison finally gets the call at about 0045, and dispatches a Squad #2 unit (the residence is in district #2, about 0.75 mi. from the blast). Upon arrival at 0048 hrs., Metuchen M-6 is already on scene providing CPR. Edison A-10 begins SAED protocol, and is told no ALS unit is available. The patient, a 37 year old female with a history of cardiac myopia, is transported in M-6 with our EMT-D to JFK hospital, where she is pronounced dead.
00:45 hrs.
Texas Eastern Workers arrive at the Linden, NJ pump station and exchange facility, and begin the shut down process.
It is reported that at the time of the blast, a noticeable pressure drop was recorded at a Texas Eastern control room in Houston. The drop was recorded and interpreted at a "possible breech" somewhere between Lambertville and Linden.
01:00 hrs.
Virtually all disaster resources in Edison Twp. are now engaged. Public Utilities are on scene to maintain water pressure and power, and the Edison Road Dept. sets up barricades along all major roadways. Thousands of onlookers are along roadways in all directions, and Edison's auxiliary police force is called in for added security. Traffic on all major roadways in Edison Twp. are backed up with spectators.
01:15 hrs.
The concern now is for hypothermia of the evacuees. Buses begin to arrive at both staging areas, transporting persons to the evacuation centers. Those left waiting are given food and water.
Sq. #2 Lt. Scott Corbin is now contacted at the station and advised of the situation.
Rumors are that the fire will persist until daylight, and that up to 200 persons may have been killed in the burning apartments.
Relief crews are set up at the station and bed down for the night.
02:20 hrs.
The pipeline is shut down, and the remaining gas burns away as the torch blows out. Nearly 2.5 hours after the explosion, the heat begins to fade away.
11:00-12:00 hrs.
12 hours after the explosion, hot spots still burn at some of the destroyed buildings. The first EMS crews are summoned in, setting up an interior triage area with cots and army litters from Rescue 2. Oxygen and trauma kits, along with fresh linen and water, are on hand, and sets of 20 firefighters are evaluated on a continuing basis. Federal Investigators from OSHA, NTSB, and NJ DEPE, along with Texas Eastern reps, arrive to begin the investigation. This is my first sight of the damage.
By noon, 29 people have been treated at JFK hospital, and another 40+ were treated at the site and released. The only death reported is the cardiac arrest, but 200+ people are still unaccounted. Continues news coverage broadcasts phone numbers for evacuees to call to notify their families, and report to Edison High, where Durham Woods management has the contract-lease listing to account for the residents.
18:00 hrs.
8 Light trucks stage at the Pines Manor, and are moved into the scene. A meeting is held by the Edison ERT-S.W.A.T. team, along with County PD and a US Marine Division. Power is still out in the complex, and looting may be prevalent. 8 lighting posts and 10 tactical security posts are established. 4 more light trucks are called in as night falls, and the entire complex is illuminated by the rescue units and stand-alone generators w/ lights. Salvation Army is on hand through the night with meals for the personnel, as County PD cars continuously patrol the complex assisted by Marines. Several teenagers are apprehended by the railroad tracks, but all else is quite for the night.
Approximately 600 persons remain at Edison High through the
night, and numerous persons are transported to hospitals, mostly for stress-related symptoms. Ambulances are continuously summoned to Edison High, and from the EMS Command Post to handle regular EMS calls in the township, including and overturned vehicle with entrapment. Road Dept. trucks with diesel fuel make their rounds to the Rescue trucks for refueling. Relief crews sleep at the Red Roof, where local caterers and supermarkets have brought in food and supplies.
EPILOG
The Edison, NJ Pipeline disaster lasted 87 hrs. from initial explosion until operations termination. 1 person died as a result, and 127 were injured. All public safety sectors were involved, including law enforcement, fire, EMS, public works, disaster services, private contractors, housing authority, and civilian help. Both paid and volunteer personnel gave numerous hours, and generosity was as abundant as the black ash from the fallout. In what was unquestionable Edison's and perhaps Middlesex County's worse disaster, all the involved agencies worked very well together, minimizing loss of life and injury, and providing public safety, while maintaining some semblance of routine life for Edison citizens.
In the first 15 minutes of the disaster, 15,000 calls were made to 9-1-1. Within 1 hour, the total coalls to 9-1-1 and 7 digit numbers to Edison and Metuchen Dispatch were in excess of 200,000. Many were reports of fires all over Edison, Metuchen, and Piscataway, but many were also people crying "the world is ending, what should I do?". A result of lacking education regarding 9-1-1 use.
The blast and fire was seen and heard as far away as Pennsylvania and New York. One EMT from Long Island, and one from Staten Island made the trip just to lend a hand at Staging. Other single person help came unannounced from Monclair, West Orange, Jackson, and Belmar. All were amazed.
The following is a list of law enforcement and EMS units involved over the 4-day period. Fire units, rumored to be over 100 in number, were not available at this time.
Prepared by
Lt. Daniel J. Januseski, BA, EMT-D
Health & Safety, Public Affairs
Edison Twp. EMS
Edison First Aid Squad #2, Inc.
Videos of this incident can be viewed here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NyMbaZ9FVjA&mode=related&search=natural%20gas
http://www.livevideo.com/video/9DA8E608A7D24746ABD54660B16180B6/edison-natural-gas-explosion-durham-woods.aspx
Explosion of gas pipeline 2005
Ukhta town, Komi Republic, Russia
Explosion of gas pipeline to the
North-West of Ukhta.
http://www.murashev.com/ukhta/pictures.php?category=5
Explosion of gas pipeline pictured from
Lenina steet, 57. Photographed: 2005 November 9
Explosion of gas pipeline pictured from
Lenina steet, 57. Photographed: 2005 November 9
A view from the west edge of Ukhta. Photographed: 2005 November 9
A view from Kuratova street. Photographed: 2005 November 9
Photographed: 2005 November 9
A view from the intersection of Lenina
and Kosmonavtov streets. Photographed: 2005 November 9
Criminal indictments in deadly pipeline explosion
Friday, September 14, 2001
By PAUL SHUKOVSKY
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
A federal grand jury brought criminal indictments yesterday against two companies and three employees in connection with the June 1999 Bellingham pipeline explosion that killed a fisherman and two 10-year-old boys who were playing in a nearby creek.
When the pipeline ruptured at Hannah Creek, about 229,000 gallons of gasoline gushed into the waterway, ignited and created a fireball that consumed the three people and left the area around the creek looking like a battlefield.
From Hannah Creek, thousand of gallons of fuel rushed into Whatcom Creek, which empties into Bellingham Bay.
The indictments allege disregard of safety regulations and procedures and failure to make critical repairs as required by the federal Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act. And it directly links these alleged criminal actions to the explosion.
Marlene Robinson, mother of 18-year-old Liam Wood, who died while fishing in Whatcom Creek, called the filing of felony charges "a relief. This indictment shows that for corporations, profit cannot be their only bottom line."
The indictments name the Olympic Pipe Line Co., Equilon Pipeline Co., and three of their officers or employees: Frank Hopf Jr., vice president and manager of Olympic; Ronald Dean Brentson, the Olympic executive in charge of monitoring and controlling the pipeline, and Kevin Scott Dyvig, a pipeline controller.
Five of the counts allege felony violations of the pipeline safety act. The two others allege misdemeanor violations of the Clean Water Act by negligent discharge of oil into a navigable water.
Brentson faces three felony counts, Hopf faces one misdemeanor and one felony count, and Dyvig one misdemeanor charge.
The indictments charge in detail how Olympic, with Hopf at the helm:
# Failed to protect its pipeline while new water pipelines were laid above and below it.
# Ignored damage detected after the water pipes were laid.
# Violated its spill prevention plan filed with the state that provided for Olympic to excavate and visually inspect the damage detected after the water pipes were laid.
# Ignored information that indicated increasing pressure in the pipeline.
# Ignored repeated automatic shutdowns caused by the improper pressure surge relief valve settings and continued to operate with the dangerous system configuration.
# Ignored a June 10, 1999 failure of the pressure surge relief valve that led to the catastrophic rupture at the exact location where the water pipes had been laid. Pumps upstream of the rupture were restarted without investigating why they had automatically shutdown, thus allowing the additional release of about 79,000 gallons.
Hopf's attorney, John Wolfe issued a statement saying that "Hopf intends to vigorously defend himself" and "wished to express his heart-felt sympathy to those residents of Whatcom County whose family members or friends were injured or killed."
Brentson's lawyer, Larry Finegold, declined to comment directly, instead referring to a document he filed with the court in anticipation of an arraignment of his client. The document puts the blame for the disaster on the contractor who laid the water pipe.
"The cause of the rupture was a contractor's misplaced strokes with an excavator that stripped away the pipeline's safety margin," the court pleading reads. "But for the contractor's damage to the pipe, no rupture would have occurred. No fuel would have spilled."
What about: NO FUEL WOULD HAVE SPILLED IF THERE WAS
NEVER A DANGEROUS POORLY MAINTAINED PIPELINE THERE IN THE FIRST
PLACE???
Dyvig's lawyer, Irwin Schwartz declined to comment.
In a statement issued yesterday by Lawrence Peck, Chairman of Olympic Pipe Line's board of directors, the company said it "will be reviewing the indictment carefully with its attorneys, and will respond to it in the course of the criminal justice process."
"We are mindful of the tragic circumstances that occurred on that day, and have recommitted the company's resolve to ensure that nothing resembling this incident ever happens again," Peck said. "It continues to be Olympic's primary objective to operate its pipeline safely."
Hopf, who was vice president and district manager of Olympic's pipeline operations when the blast occurred, continues to work for minority shareholder Equilon, but in a different administrative capacity.
After becoming the controlling partner and taking over pipeline operations from Equilon in July 2000, British Petroleum Co. Ltd. removed Brentson and Dyvig from pipeline control and operations positions. Brentson had served as control center supervisor at the time of the Bellingham explosion; Dyvig was the controller.
Both men have since been shifted to administrative positions. But citing a slew of pending litigation over the Bellingham eruption, lawyers for the two men requested that they be placed on administrative leave, and both have remained so since last week.
(Note: When originally published, this article misstated how long the two had been on leave.)
The state Ecology Department in June imposed a civil fine of $7.8 million on Equilon, Olympic and IMCO, a construction company that had dug around the pipeline before the rupture. Olympic agreed to pay its portion of the fine; Equilon and IMCO are challenging theirs.
Yesterday, Equilon, which now owns only about 37.5 percent of the company, issued a brief statement confirming the grand jury's indictment. But company spokesman Cameron Smyth added, "Equilon Pipeline has not fully reviewed the indictments and cannot comment."
Katherine Dalen, the mother of 10-year-old Stephen Tsiorvas, could not be reached. And Frank King, father of 10-year-old Wade King, was stranded in Las Vegas yesterday because of the airline shutdown.
In a telephone interview, he said he hoped the indictments would change the way other companies do business. "I'm actually glad that the criminal investigation is over and we can get on with things," he said.
U.S. Representative Jay Inslee called the indictment "gratifying," but said he remains "extremely disappointed" that a pipeline safety bill he co-sponsored that calls for tighter regulation of pipeline operations "hasn't even got a floor hearing yet."
Carl Weimer, executive director of SAFE Bellingham, an organization formed after the explosion and dedicated to pipeline safety, said he was pleased with the indictment.
"I hope it really sends a message to other pipeline companies around the country that they better really start paying attention to their old pipelines and safety," he said.
TIMELINE
JUNE 10, 1999: Whatcom Creek ignites in firestorm after pipeline ruptures and dumps 229,000 gallons of gasoline. Three people are killed.
DEC. 4, 1999: State of Washington fines Olympic Pipe Line Co. $120,000 in connection with the Bellingham accident.
JUNE 2, 2000: U.S. Transportation Department issues a record $3.05 million fine against Olympic Pipe Line Co. for the Bellingham accident.
JUNE 15, 2000: The General Accounting Office issues a report finding major weaknesses in the way the federal government regulates pipelines.
SEPT. 7, 2000: Senate passes pipeline safety legislation first introduced by Sen. Patty Murray. Supporters acknowledge its weakness, but say it is better than nothing.
OCT. 10, 2000: House rejects pipeline legislation, with critics saying it was too weak. Pipeline safety is not on the current agenda.
JUNE 20, 2001: The state fines three companies $7.86 million -- the largest such penalty ever assessed -- for their alleged negligence in causing the pipeline explosion.
SEPT. 13, 2001: A federal grand jury brings criminal indictments against two companies and three employees in connection with the blast.
P-I reporters Margaret Taus, Lewis Kamb and Phuong Le contributed to this report.
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/38910_olympic14.shtml
